Writing, Notes & Quotes from 2018
Writing, Notes & Quotes from 2018
January 2018
The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge
"The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge" - Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman.
Introduction: The Problem of the Sociology of Knowledge
"It may thus be said that the sociology of knowledge constitutes the sociological focus of a much more general problem, that of the existential determination (Seinsgebundenheit) of thought as such." - (p. 4)
"In all these cases the general problem has been the extent to which thought reflects or is independent of the proposed determinative factors." - (p. 5).
"Although Mannheim did not share Scheler’s ontological ambitions, he too was uncomfortable with the pan-ideologism into which his thinking seemed to lead him. He coined the term “relationism” (in contradistinction to “relativism”) to denote the epistemological perspective of his sociology of knowledge—not a capitulation of thought before the socio-historical relativities, but a sober recognition that knowledge must always be knowledge from a certain position." - (p. 10).
"Mannheim believed that different social groups vary greatly in their capacity thus to transcend their own narrow position." (p. 10).
"Geiger returned to a narrower concept of ideology as socially distorted thought and maintained the possibility of overcoming ideology by careful adherence to scientific canons of procedure." (p. 12).
"The logical structure of this trouble is basically the same in all cases: How can I be sure, say, of my sociological analysis of American middle-class mores in view of the fact that the categories I use for this analysis are conditioned by historically relative forms of thought, that I myself and everything I think is determined by my genes and by my ingrown hostility to my fellowmen, and that, to cap it all, I am myself a member of the American middle class?" (p. 13).
"In sum, our enterprise is one of sociological theory, not of the methodology of sociology." (p. 13).
"The sociology of knowledge must concern itself with everything that passes for “knowledge” in society." (p. 13).
"Theoretical thought, “ideas,” Weltanschauungen are not that important in society. Although every society contains these phenomena, they are only part of the sum of what passes for “knowledge.”" (p. 13).
"The theoretical formulations of reality, whether they be scientific or philosophical or even mythological, do not exhaust what is “real” for the members of a society." (p. 13).
"These two statements are not contradictory. Society does indeed possess objective facticity. And society is indeed built up by activity that expresses subjective meaning." (p. 17).
I. The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life
1. THE REALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE
"The method we consider best suited to clarify the foundations of knowledge in everyday life is that of phenomenological analysis, a purely descriptive method and, as such, “empirical” but not “scientific”—as we understand the nature of the empirical sciences. " (p. 19).
"The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or rather of the subjective experience of everyday life, refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, as well as from assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena analyzed." (p. 19).
"Commonsense contains innumerable pre- and quasi-scientific interpretations about everyday reality, which it takes for granted." (p. 19).
"Whether I (the first person singular, here as in the following illustrations, standing for ordinary self-consciousness in everyday life) am viewing the panorama of New York City or whether I become conscious of an inner anxiety, the processes of consciousness involved are intentional in both instances." (p. 19).
"The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world of my dreams, but I know that the world of everyday life is as real to others as it is to myself." (p. 22).
"I know that my natural attitude to this world corresponds to the natural attitude of others, that they also comprehend the objectifications by which this world is ordered, ..." (p. 22).
"While I am capable of engaging in doubt about its reality, I am obliged to suspend such doubt as I routinely exist in everyday life." (p. 22).
"The world of everyday life proclaims itself and, when I want to challenge the proclamation, I must engage in a deliberate, by no means easy effort." (pp. 22-24).
"As long as the routines of everyday life continue without interruption they are apprehended as unproblematic." (p. 24).
"If, however, I come to the conclusion that my colleagues have gone collectively mad, the problem that presents itself is of yet another kind. I am now faced with a problem that transcends the boundaries of the reality of everyday life and points to an altogether different reality. Indeed, my conclusion that my colleagues have gone mad implies ipso facto that they have gone off into a world that is no longer the common world of everyday life." (p. 25).
"The transition between realities is marked by the rising and falling of the curtain. As the curtain rises, the spectator is “transported to another world,” with its own meanings and an order that may or may not have much to do with the order of everyday life. As the curtain falls, the spectator “returns to reality,” that is, to the paramount reality of everyday life by comparison with which the reality presented on the stage now appears tenuous and ephemeral, however vivid the presentation may have been a few moments previously." (p. 25).
"All finite provinces of meaning are characterized by a turning away of attention from the reality of everyday life." (p. 25).
"Clock and calendar ensure that, indeed, I am a “man of my time.” Only within this temporal structure does everyday life retain for me its accent of reality." (p. 28).
My Note : An assessment of time may not be absolute - such as with the sorties paradox - some times may be ambiguous
"In the face-to-face situation the other is appresented to me in a vivid present shared by both of us. I know that in the same vivid present I am appresented to him. My and his “here and now” continuously impinge on each other as long as the face-to-face situation continues." (p. 28).
"This means that, in the face-to-face situation, the other’s subjectivity is available to me through a maximum of symptoms." (p. 28).
"All other forms of relating to the other are, in varying degrees, “remote.”" (p. 28).
"Of course I “know myself better” than I can ever know him. My subjectivity is accessible to me in a way his can never be, no matter how “close” our relationship." (p. 28).
Truth -A Guide for the Perplexed
Blackburn, Simon. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed: A Guide for the Perplexed, Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
Introduction
"The idea that our stories about the world and ourselves are just transient constructions, that our perspective is just one among many, or that illusion and fiction are pervasive, undermines the seriousness with which we can regard defects of sincerity and accuracy." (p. xvi).
"Relativism, by contrast, chips away at our right to disapprove of what anybody says. Its central message is that there are no asymmetries of reason and knowledge, objectivity and truth. Relativism thus goes beyond counselling that we must try to understand those whose opinions are different. It is not only that we must try to understand them, but also that we must accept a complete symmetry of standing. Their opinions ‘deserve the same respect’ as our own." (p. xviii).
1 Faith, Belief and Reason
1.1 - Clifford’s Duties
Blackburn, Simon. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed: A Guide for the Perplexed (p. 3). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
"The human understanding is not composed of dry light, but is subject to influence from the will and the emotions, a fact that creates fanciful knowledge; man prefers to believe what he wants to be true." Francis Bacon, The New Organon, XLIX, p. 441. (pp. 1-3).
"Clifford is surely right that we censure the negligent shipowner. We would find his ‘faith’ in his ship discreditable, even though Clifford is careful to tell us that it is sincere. About this Clifford comments that:
The sincerity of his conviction can in no wise help him; because he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him. He had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts." (p. 5).
"Clifford sees the problem, and answers it in terms of method rather than in terms of results:
In regard, then, to the sacred tradition of humanity, we learn that it consists, not in propositions or statements which are to be accepted and believed on the authority of the tradition, but in questions rightly asked, in conceptions which enable us to ask further questions, and in methods of answering questions. The value of all these things depends on their being tested day by day." (pp. 6-7).
1.2 - Will and Passion in James
"It is as if James is objectifying belief. He treats it as one might treat an ornament, for which the only questions would be: does this suit me; is it a good thing to wear to the social party? And then taking the ornament (conviction) or leaving it behind (avoiding it) are options that may be quite evenly balanced." (p. 8).
"A related charge is that James is privatizing belief, concentrating not upon the social trust that is at the forefront of Clifford’s discussion, but upon the private satisfactions that follow upon settling a matter in one’s own mind. And it is this privatization of belief that leads to relativism: my belief ceases to exist in a public space, up for acceptance or rejection by all who pay attention." (p. 9).
"The satisfactions of people who hold one or other conviction are not to the point, unless the issue itself is one about those very satisfactions." (p. 9).
"Upon hearing a purported piece of information, the reaction was not ‘Is this true?’ but ‘Why is this person saying this? – What machinations or manipulations are going on here?’ The question of truth did not, as it were, have the social space in which it could breathe." (p. 10).
"In his reply to Clifford, we found him objectifying and privatizing belief, downplaying its connection with representation and truth, and stressing instead its personal function." (p. 13).
2 Man the Measure
"The idols of the tribe are founded in human nature itself and in the very tribe or race of mankind. The assertion that the human senses are the measure of things is false; to the contrary, all perceptions, both of sense and mind, are relative to man, not to the universe. The human understanding is like an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of things, which thus distorts and corrupts it." Francis Bacon, The New Organon, XLI, p. 41. (pp. 23-25).
2.3 - The Variation of Subjectivities
Blackburn, Simon. Truth: A Guide for the Perplexed: A Guide for the Perplexed (p. 32). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
"You are an instrument calibrated one way, and I am an instrument calibrated a different way, and that seems to be the end of it. We have different ways of responding. We have our different responses, our different subjectivities, but there is no question of fault or error. In our own time, of course, we can easily extend the argument to variations lying between one culture and another, or one gender and another, or one language or culture or historical period and another. What is salient to one culture need not be so to another." (pp. 32-33).
"What our history and language make it easy to think in terms of, another might conceal, and vice versa.
This is always the central argument for either relativism or scepticism: we can christen it the argument from the variation of subjectivities." (p. 33).
"The variations of subjectivity bolster the move to the sceptical suspension of judgement, the epoche that was the intermediate goal of classical scepticism, the overall moral aim being ataraxia or the tranquillity of mind that comes from suspending all judgement." (pp. 33-34).
"There remains only the ‘is’ of actual response, not the ‘ought’ of the right or true way to respond. And a whole host of interrelated notions disappears along with that ‘ought’: notions of the rational way to respond, or the objective response, or the required response or the better informed response."(p. 35).
Last updated
